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Regulating Sugar-Sweetened Beverages 
Tyler Rauh* 
American waistlines are an international punchline, and United 
States taxpayers spend hundreds of billions of dollars each year 
to combat medical complications resulting from obesity. The 
personal costs are financial, emotional, and mortal. Projections 
insist that it will become worse. Section I details the obesity 
epidemic and ponders why the United States is uniquely 
unhealthy. 
The reason could be that America consumes more sugar than any 
other country. In recent years, some municipal policymakers have 
attempted to restrain America’s sweet tooth by taxing sugar-
sweetened beverages. Initial responses are polarizing. Chicago’s 
tax did not last three months before its abolishment. 
Philadelphia’s tax raised over sixty-five million dollars in its first 
ten months, but public opinion skews negative. The health effects, 
however, have been positive. Section II analyzes the benefits and 
concerns regarding these sugar-sweetened beverage taxes, and it 
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will compare approaches in other countries that may be more 
effective at reducing obesity. 
Mandated disclosures, including nutritional panels and warnings, 
are another tactic legislators have used to combat the epidemic. 
San Francisco took an inspired approach to battling sugar 
consumption by mandating a disclosure on print advertisements 
for sugar-sweetened beverages: “WARNING: drinking beverages 
with added sugar(s) contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth 
decay.” The American Beverage Association met the ordinance 
with a First Amendment challenge. It convinced a Ninth Circuit 
panel that the message chills commercial speech by forcing its 
members to convey a controversial message and imposing an 
undue burden on beverage manufacturers because non-beverage 
sugar producers arbitrarily escape the ordinance’s purview. In an 
en banc rehearing, the Ninth Circuit confirmed reversal, but it did 
so only on the ground that the size of the warning was unduly 
burdensome. The judges disagreed on many issues in reaching 
that conclusion. Section III assesses the freedom of speech claim 
and finds that the Ninth Circuit panel may have reached its 
conclusion based on biased or flawed research. 
Although the panel decision hinted that policymakers’ options for 
fighting the obesity epidemic are limited, sugar taxes and 
mandatory disclosures can still be effective if correctly 
implemented. Section IV concludes with a proposal for extensive 
sugar taxes and warnings, similar to the tobacco strategy in recent 
decades, so that consumers have more knowledge about what they 
are ingesting while being financially incentivized to choose 
healthier options. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.  America’s Big, Unique Problem 
The United States is facing an epidemic. From coast to coast, obesity 
rates have reached unprecedented heights.1 In 1991, obese adults made up 
less than fifteen percent of the population in most states.2 Recent surveys, 
however, indicate over a third of American adults are obese.3 
The trend is not confined to adults. Childhood obesity rates have 
climbed to over seventeen percent,4 a significant increase from eleven 
                                                                                                             
1 See Maggie Fox, America’s Obesity Epidemic Hits a New High, NBC NEWS (June 7, 
2016, 1:40 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/america-s-obesity-
epidemic-hits-new-high-n587251. 
2 Obese adult is medically defined as an adult having a body mass index surpassing 
thirty percent. See Maggie Fox, If you think we’re fat now, wait till 2030, NBC NEWS (Sept. 
18, 2012, 10:03 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/if-you-think-were-
fat-now-wait-till-2030-f1B5955205. 
3 See Cynthia L. Ogden et. al., Prevalence of Obesity Among Adults and Youth: United 
States, 2011–2014, 219 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 1, 1 (2015), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db219.pdf. 
4 Id. at 5. 
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percent in the early nineties and four percent in the early seventies.5 These 
trends have led researchers to predict that over forty percent of American 
adults will be obese by 2030.6 
Obesity rates over forty percent could spell disaster for the future of 
the United States. While obesity is often viewed through a cosmetic lens, 
the nature of the epidemic lies in the devastating health effects it causes. 
Obese people are at an increased risk for high blood pressure, stroke, 
coronary heart disease, gallbladder disease, osteoarthritis, anxiety, 
depression, liver cancer, breast cancer, colon cancer, endometrial cancer, 
and other harmful health problems.7 The best predictor of type 2 diabetes 
is being overweight or obese.8 Type 2 diabetes is usually diagnosed after 
the age of forty, but now it is found in children and adolescents.9 Diabetes 
and its related complications are major causes of mortality in the United 
States, with an estimated quarter-million deaths attributed to the disease 
each year despite being largely preventable.10 
Beyond the dire consequences at the personal level, obesity also 
imposes significant costs on society. Health care spending estimates for 
obesity are as high as $210 billion annually.11 Estimated indirect costs, 
which relate to morbidity and productivity, are $450 billion each year.12 
The epidemic’s substantial financial and mortal costs ultimately spurred 
three decades of research to find a solution.13 
Research indicates obesity has many factors. Some factors are outside 
of an individual’s control, such as genetics or illness.14 Others are a 
                                                                                                             
5 Health, United States, 2004, 28 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 1, 179 
(2004), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus04trend.pdf. 
6 Lauran Neergard, No end to US obesity epidemic, forecast shows, NBC NEWS (May 
7, 2012, 7:20 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/47324248/ns/health-
diet_and_nutrition/t/no-end-us-obesity-epidemic-forecast-shows/. 
7 The Health Effects of Overweight and Obesity, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/healthyweight/effects/index.html (last updated June 5, 
2015) (citations omitted). 
8 See Michael K. Palmer & Peter P. Toth, Trends in Lipids, Obesity, Metabolic 
Syndrome, and Diabetes Mellitus in the United States: An NHANES Analysis (2003-2004 
to 2013-2014), 27 THE OBESITY SOC’Y 309, 309–14 (Feb. 2019). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Alex Brill, The Long-Term Returns of Obesity Prevention Policies, MATRIX GLOBAL 
ADVISORS 1 (Apr. 2013), https://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/reports/2013/
rwjf405694. 
12 Id. 
13 See Fox, supra note 1. 
14 See Adult Obesity Causes & Consequences, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/obesity/adult/causes.html (last updated Mar. 5, 2018). 
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consequence of environment, including socioeconomic factors.15 But 
policymakers and organizations have used resources to influence people 
to make better decisions regarding factors that are typically within an 
individual’s control—lack of physical activity, excessive calorie 
consumption, and deficient nutritional education.16 Organized efforts to 
induce Americans to lose weight have, however, failed to curtail climbing 
obesity rates.17 
The research is not for naught, though. The United States ranks 
second, behind only Austria, in calorie consumption by capita, with 
Greece, Belgium, and Italy not far behind.18 Yet the United States is the 
only nation of that group to appear on the list of the top-ten most obese 
countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), with the notorious distinction of being the only 
country with more than thirty-five percent of its population obese.19 Each 
of those other four countries has a moderate obesity rate between nineteen 
and twenty-five percent.20 This indicates that the obesity epidemic may not 
be due to the volume of calories an average American consumes but, 
rather, the nutritional nature of those calories. Research and legislation 
have thus shifted to another area where the United States leads all other 
countries: sugar consumption.21 
B.  Sugar’s Role in the Obesity Epidemic 
The gap between the United States and Germany, second-highest on 
the list of countries ranked by average daily sugar intake, is larger than the 
gap between Germany and Saudi Arabia, which is fifteenth on the list.22 
                                                                                                             
15 See Nia S. Mitchell et al., Obesity: Overview of an Epidemic, 2011 PSYCHIATR. CLIN. 
N. AM. 1, 4–5, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3228640/pdf/nihms
334812.pdf. 
16 See Paula Whitacre & Annina Burns, Perspectives from the United Kingdom and 
United States Policy Makers on Obesity Prevention, 2010 INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L 
ACADS. 1, 20 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK220236/pdf/Bookshelf_
NBK220236.pdf. 
17 See Fox, supra note 1. 
18 Food Consumption Nutrients, 2008 FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/ess/documents/food_security_statistics/FoodCon
sumptionNutrients_en.xls. 
19 Prevalence of Obesity Among Adults, BMI≥30, Age-Standardized Estimates by 
Country, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://apps.who.int/gho/data/view.main.CTRY2450A?
lang=en (last updated Sept. 22, 2017). 
20 Id. 
21 Roberto A. Ferdman, Where people around the world eat the most sugar and fat, THE 
WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/02/05
/where-people-around-the-world-eat-the-most-sugar-and-fat/?utm_term=.8680dc0d6005 
(last updated Jan. 29, 2019). 
22 Id. 
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At 126.4 grams of sugar per day, the average United States citizen is 
consuming more than double what the World Health Organization 
recommends for daily intake.23 
Analyzing other countries produces a positive correlation between 
sugar consumption and elevated levels of obesity. Australia, Canada, 
Mexico, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom each have average daily 
sugar intakes between eighty-two and ninety-six grams, placing them 
within the fifteen countries that consume the most sugar.24 Each of those 
nations also falls within third and eighth on the list of the most obese 
OECD countries.25 
Vanguard policymakers addressing America’s status as a gluttonous 
nation believe they can curtail the obesity epidemic by deterring sugar 
consumption.26 But the question remains as to the best strategy in attacking 
the sweetener. Some advocate for sugar taxes, citing the revenue it could 
generate while potentially reducing obesity.27 Part II of this paper will 
focus on the potential income, the initial public response, and the 
effectiveness of implementing an excise tax on sugar-sweetened 
beverages. Part II also proposes a version of the tax that is variable upon 
the quantity of sugar within the drink, not the quantity of liquid, to 
overcome the shortcomings of a traditional excise tax on sugar-sweetened 
beverages. 
Some municipalities have taken more creative approaches than taxes. 
In 2012, under former mayor Michael Bloomberg, New York City’s Board 
of Health passed a ban on selling sugary drinks in excess of sixteen ounces 
at movie theaters, restaurants, mobile food carts, and sports arenas.28 The 
beverage cap was, however, struck down by the New York State Court of 
Appeals due to the Board of Health acting outside its scope of regulatory 
                                                                                                             
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Prevalence of Obesity Among Adults, BMI ≥ 30, Age-Standardized Estimates by 
Country, supra note 19. 
26 See Jennifer L. Pomeranz et. al., Innovative Legal Approaches to Address Obesity, 87 
MILBANK QUARTERLY 185, 189 (2009), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/sugarman
/Milbank_published.pdf (explaining that the FTC, as early as 1978, initiated rules for sugar 
product television advertising aimed towards children). 
27 See Cabrera Escobar et al., Evidence that a tax on sugar sweetened beverages reduces 
the obesity rate: A Meta-Analysis, 2016 BMC PUB. HEALTH 1, 6 
https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-13-
1072?site=bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com. 
28 See Nadia Arumugam, Why Soda Ban Will Work In Fight Against Obesity; Food 
Regulations Have Proven Record, 2019 FORBES MEDIA LLC, (last updated Sep. 14, 2012 
1:35 PM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/nadiaarumugam/2012/09/14/why-soda-ban-will-
work-in-fight-against-obesity-food-regulations-have-a-proven-record/#2e6fda254d86 
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authority.29 Three years later, San Francisco unanimously passed an 
ordinance requiring advertisements for sugar-sweetened beverages to 
contain a black box warning: “drinking beverages with added sugar(s) 
contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay.”30 Part III analyzes the 
First Amendment challenge that ordinance faced from the American 
Beverage Association. The issue hinged upon whether the warning met the 
Zauderer standard: a compelled disclosure is required to be purely factual 
and uncontroversial without being unduly burdensome on the advertiser 
so as to chill its commercial speech.31 This test necessitates an inquiry into 
sugar consumption science and whether the requirement creates an unfair 
burden on beverage companies when compared to other sugar suppliers, 
both of which will also be discussed in Part III. 
The Ninth Circuit panel concluded the message is controversial and 
the warning imposed an undue burden for beverage companies, and thus 
the ordinance failed the Zauderer standard.32 This decision could pose 
issues for future legislation that mandates disclosure requirements on 
beverage companies. Part IV will take measure of what the future may 
hold for beverage suppliers’ advertising practices and argues that, for 
sugar warnings to be constitutionally permissible, food manufacturers 
must have the same mandated disclosures as beverage manufacturers. 
II. BITTERSWEET TAXES 
Proponents of a city- or county-level sugar tax believe it can kill two 
birds with one stone: reduce obesity and bolster budgets.33 Advocates for 
a sugar tax have gained support in recent years with at least seven 
municipalities placing taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages since 2015.34 
Philadelphia enacted a 1.5 cent-per-ounce tax at the beginning of 2017;35 
and Seattle’s ordinance—at 1.75 cents-per-ounce—triggered at the 
                                                                                                             
29 See New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. New York 
City Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene, 23 N.E.3d 538, 541 (N.Y. 2014). 
30 Am. Bev. Ass’n v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 871 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 2017). 
31 Id. at 891–92. 
32 Id. at 895–97. 
33 See Angelica LaVito, Cook County’s repeal of its ‘soda tax’ may pause efforts in other 
cities, CNBC NEWS, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/01/cook-countys-repeal-of-its-soda-
tax-may-pause-efforts-in-other-cities.html (last updated Dec. 1, 2017, 7:17 PM). 
34 Id. 
35 Courtney Shupert & Scott Drenkard, Soda Tax Experiment Failing in Philadelphia 
Amid Consumer Angst and Revenue Shortfalls, TAX FOUNDATION (Aug. 3, 2017), 
https://taxfoundation.org/philadelphia-soda-tax-failing/. 
276 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:269 
 
beginning of 2018.36 But opponents of the tax have made their voices 
heard. Cook County, home to Chicago, passed a sugary drink tax that 
lasted fewer than three months before falling to the pressure of the masses 
clamoring for its end.37 And voters in Santa Fe rejected a similar soda tax 
referendum in May 2017.38 
The following subsections will discuss the financial advantages and 
disadvantages of a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages; the potential for a 
tax to effectively reduce obesity in the United States; and a proposal for a 
variable tax referendum that charges suppliers by the level of sugar in the 
drink (e.g., a penny-per-teaspoon of sugar), instead of the beverage’s 
overall volume, so as to maximize the tax’s deterrence effect while 
minimizing arbitrary distinctions to determine if beverages will fall within 
the purview of a sugar tax. 
A. Uncle Sam’s Sweet Tooth: Will a Tax Help the Cause or Cause 
a Cavity in Consumers’ Wallets? 
1. Initial research results on sugar taxes are inconclusive 
but skew positive. 
Efforts have been made, both domestically and internationally, to 
research the merits of a sugar tax’s effect on public health.39 The City of 
Seattle granted the University of Washington $500,000 to study the 
effectiveness, implementation, and unintended consequences of the King 
County beverage tax that took effect at the beginning of 2018.40 And 
Michael Bloomberg continued his advocacy of soda regulation by granting 
                                                                                                             
36 See Patrick Quinn, New Year, new tax: Seattle starts taxing sweetened drinks, KOMO 
NEWS (Jan. 1, 2018), http://komonews.com/news/local/new-year-new-tax-seattle-starts-
taxing-sweetened-drinks. 
37 Caitlin Dewey, Why Chicago’s soda tax fizzled after two months – and what it means 





39 Jason M. Fletcher, David Frisvold & Nathan Tefft, Can Soft Drink Taxes Reduce 
Population Weight?, CONTEMPORARY ECON. POL’Y 1–2 (Jan. 2010), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2908024/pdf/nihms-151114.pdf. 
40 Bernard Ellouk, University of Washington to study Seattle soda tax, KING 5 NEWS 
(Dec. 29, 2017, 4:04 AM), http://www.king5.com/article/news/health/university-of-
washington-to-study-seattle-soda-tax/281-503028380. 
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the University of Illinois at Chicago $2.5 million to study whether the 
sugar tax improves public health over an extended period of time.41 
An initial meta-analysis covering the United States, Mexico, France, 
and Brazil shows that an increase in the price of sugar-sweetened 
beverages is associated with a decrease in sugar consumption and modest 
reductions in weight in the population.42 As a corollary, the price increase 
on sugar-sweetened beverages also resulted in increased consumption of 
healthier beverages, such as milk.43 In contrast, a systemic literature 
review claims the effectiveness of a taxation policy to curb obesity is 
doubtful.44 That study bases its conclusion on the behavioral and 
environmental factors that result in consumers’ poor substitution 
tendencies: if their preferred food or drink is taxed, then consumers often 
choose to consume even more calories from other foods or drinks 
instead.45 Ultimately, the only universal consensus is that research 
regarding the impact of a tax on obesity rates is incomplete without 
sufficient real-life tests to determine how large the influence could be in 
the United States.46 
Researchers claim the tax is working in Mexico, however.47 The 
country imposed a peso-per-liter tax on sugar-sweetened beverages at the 
beginning of 2014 in an attempt to slim down from the second-most obese 
nation in the world.48 Estimates claim that Mexicans consumed almost ten 
percent fewer sugary drinks in 2015 than they would have if the tax never 
took effect.49 But the data from Mexico is difficult to apply to United 
States cities due to “leakage.”50 The Mexican tax is nationwide, but 
                                                                                                             
41 Greg Trotter, $2.5 million Bloomberg grant funds UIC study on Cook County soda 
tax, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Sept. 25, 2017, 12:55 PM), http://www.chicagotribune
.com/business/ct-biz-cook-county-soda-tax-study-20170925-story.html. 
42 See Escobar et al., supra note 27. 
43 Id. 
44 Nikolaos Maniadakis et al., A systemic review of the effectiveness of taxes on 
nonalcoholic beverages and high-in-fat foods as a means to prevent obesity trends, 
CLINICOECONOMICS AND OUTCOMES RES. 523–24 (Oct. 18, 2013), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3810203/pdf/ceor-5-519.pdf. 
45 Id. 
46 Roberta R. Friedman, A Soda Tax — Will it Change Anything?, OBESITY ACTION 
COALITION, http://www.obesityaction.org/educational-resources/resource-articles-2/
nutrition/a-soda-tax-will-it-change-anything. 
47 Ronnie Cohen, Taxes trimmed Mexican soda consumption for two years, REUTERS 




50 See Lizzie Wade, Mexico’s Soda Tax is Working. The US Should Learn From It., 
WIRED (July 13, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/07/mexicos-soda-tax-
working-us-learn/. 
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citizens of American localities with a beverage tax may simply cross city 
or county lines to stock up on their favorite soda. Such leakage makes the 
tax much easier to avoid.51 In Seattle, local Costco stores posted signs 
telling shoppers where to go to avoid the tax.52 Likewise, many Chicago 
residents near the border of Cook County made “pop runs to Indiana” 
during the tax’s couple months of existence, causing local businesses to 
lose some consumers.53 Experts say the lack of leakage in Mexico could 
make its data more broadly applicable because it affects more people in 
different kinds of communities—from the poorest rural areas to the richest 
in Mexico City—as opposed to data that emerges from American cities 
where a sugar tax could have a more drastic relative impact on low-income 
households.54 
2. Sugar-sweetened beverage taxes: a war on the poor? 
Sugar-sweetened beverage taxes disproportionately target the poor, 
for better or worse. The poorer Mexican households have shown the 
largest drops in sugary beverage purchases with a nearly twelve percent 
decrease over the initial two years of the tax.55 This could be an 
encouraging sign considering low-income neighborhoods have a higher 
prevalence of diabetes than wealthy neighborhoods.56 But opponents of 
the tax, including Senator Bernie Sanders, claim that this is a cause for 
concern because the tax disproportionately hurts the poor.57 For example, 
in Philadelphia the price for a 24-ounce drink that normally costs a dollar 
increased to $1.35 with the 1.5 cent-per-ounce tax.58 If consumed once 
daily, that extra thirty-five cents would amount to over one percent of the 
yearly earnings for the 185,000 people living on less than $12,000 per year 
                                                                                                             
51 Id. 
52 Suzanne Phan, Seattle’s new soda tax prices making some shoppers’ eyes ‘pop’, 
KOMO NEWS (Jan. 5, 2018), http://komonews.com/news/local/seattle-soda-tax-surprising-
shoppers-tax-revenue-to-go-to-food-accesseducation-programs. 
53 Greg Trotter, No tears for end of Cook County soda tax – and no more pop runs to 
Indiana, CHI. TRIBUNE (Dec. 1, 2017, 12:25 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business
/ct-biz-soda-tax-repeal-reaction-20171201-story.html. 
54 See Wade, supra note 50. 
55 See Escobar et al., supra note 27. 
56 Doreen M Rabi et al., Association of socio-economic status with diabetes prevalence 
and utilization of diabetes care services, BMC HEALTH SERVS. RES. 5 (Oct. 3, 2006), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1618393/pdf/1472-6963-6-124.pdf. 
57 Bernie Sanders, A Soda Tax Would Hurt Philly’s Low-Income Families, PHILA MAG. 
(Apr. 24, 2016, 5:00 PM), http://www.phillymag.com/citified/2016/04/24/bernie-sanders-
soda-tax-op-ed/. 
58 Daniel Banko-Ferran, Philly’s Soda Tax Will Disproportionately Hurt the Poor, 
ECONOMICS21 (Jan. 9, 2017), https://economics21.org/html/philly%E2%80%99s-soda-
tax-will-disproportionately-hurt-poor-2186.html. 
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in Philadelphia.59 The extra tax could impose difficult decisions on citizens 
with limited financial flexibility: is a lifestyle change in order or will the 
extra cost come from a different part of their budget? 
The tax disproportionately hurts the poor because low-income 
Americans drink the most soda.60 While the popularity of soda has been 
falling over recent years within the middle and upper classes, the same has 
not happened among the low-income class.61 More popular among the 
middle and upper classes are custom-made beverages from places such as 
Starbucks.62 Beverages from these locations, however, are exempt from 
current versions of most sugar taxes despite often containing more sugar 
than soda.63 For example, in Seattle, lattés and cappuccinos are considered 
beverages in which milk is the primary natural ingredient, placing them in 
an exempt category.64 Other exempt categories include baby formula and 
cough syrup (i.e., products that do not contribute to obesity).65 
Diet soda is also more popular among high-income Americans than 
low-income Americans.66 Yet diet soda has escaped the purview of some 
sugar taxes,67 despite research indicating daily consumption of diet soda is 
associated with obesity and a sixty-seven percent greater risk of type 2 
diabetes when compared to non-consumption.68 Some critics claim these 
factors indicate that the tax does not exist to promote greater public health, 
but rather it is an upper class war on the poor: the financially unfortunate 
get an extra tax on their preferred daily beverage, while the upper and 
                                                                                                             
59 See id. 
60 Martha C. White, The Paradox of the Sugar Tax: How Buying a Soda Benefits 




62 See Vince Dixon, What Do Starbucks Locations Really Say About Income and 
Diversity in America? EATER (Nov. 20, 2015, 11:33 AM), https://www.eater.com/a/
starbucks-income-map. 
63 Compare STARBUCKS, https://www.starbucks.com/menu/catalog/product?
drink=espresso#view_control=nutrition, with COCA-COLA, https://www.coca-
colaproductfacts.com/en/products/. 




66 Daniel Beekman, Prices going up for sugary drinks as Seattle tax kicks in, THE 
SEATTLE TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/promoting-health-at-
a-hefty-price-seattles-soda-tax-starts-jan-1/ (last updated Jan. 1, 2018, 1:15 AM). 
67 Id. 
68 Jennifer A. Nettleton et al., Diet Soda Intake and Risk of Incident Metabolic Syndrome 
and Type 2 Diabetes in the Multi-Ethnic Study of Atherosclerosis (MESA), 32 DIABETES 
CARE 688, 691 (2009). 
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middle classes can enjoy their equally unhealthy choice with no 
upcharge.69 
Advocates for the tax retort that the price increase is aimed to help the 
low-income population long-term, both financially and medicinally.70 The 
primary objective is to discourage people from buying sugary drinks, not 
necessarily make people pay more for sustenance.71 Doctors, 
psychologists, and economists believe people will be encouraged to make 
the healthier choice when forced to pay more for a sugar-sweetened 
beverage than water, sugarless soda, or milk.72 This should be especially 
true for low-income consumers who have a higher sensitivity to price 
increases.73 After consistently making healthier beverage choices by 
reducing the consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages, there should be 
a positive effect on health and obesity among low-income populations.74 
3. The macro financial consequences of a sugar-sweetened 
beverage tax 
A reduction in obese and overweight individuals would result in 
substantial health care savings at both personal and public levels.75 Studies 
show that annual per-person medical costs for overweight individuals are 
$266 and $1,723 for obese individuals (circa 2008 American dollars).76 At 
the public level, the costs amount to hundreds of billions of dollars.77 Sugar 
tax proponents argue that the tax simply provides an immediate economic 
incentive to make a choice that will save the consumer and society 
immense amounts of money long-term while simultaneously preventing 
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premature mortality.78 And those that forego the economic incentive will 
provide revenue to help offset the expenses of obesity as they drink 
products that contribute to the obesity epidemic, thereby mitigating their 
damage on society.79 
The tax’s economic benefits are not strictly long-term or health 
related.80 Seattle anticipates $14.8 million in 2018 revenues from its new 
tax.81 The city intends to spend at least $3 million of the proceeds on 
educational programs and other community-wide incentives; $500,000 on 
a program designed to train workers adversely affected by the reduction in 
beverage sales; and millions more on providing affordable access to 
healthy, nutritional foods for its citizens.82 In Philadelphia, the city 
primarily passed a sugar tax to fund free city-wide pre-kindergarten 
education and other community programs.83 The city’s total take after the 
first ten months was $66.2 million.84 And there are already encouraging 
signs of positive health benefits in Philadelphia, despite the tax being 
primarily focused on generating revenue.85 A study of the city’s sugar tax, 
which analyzed 109 million transactions, found bottled water sales 
increased nine percent and carbonated soft drink sales fell fifty-five 
percent in the city.86 Leakage was likely responsible for some of the 
reduction in carbonated soft drinks because sales rose thirty-eight percent 
just outside of the city,87 but early reports are promising on both the 
financial and health fronts. 
Municipal sugar taxes are in an infantile stage, however, and may not 
survive to toddlerhood.88 A public backlash promptly dispatched the Cook 
County tax;89 and shoppers’ initial shock in Seattle could spell a similar 
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fate for its tax.90 The problem may be that the bulk of the tax is being felt 
at the retail level, resulting in bloated prices for the consumer.91 An input 
tax in the supply chain may be more amenable to consumers and a superior 
public health bet.92 
B. Taxing the Quantity of Sugar, Not the Quantity of Liquid 
If producers are taxed by the quantity of sugar in the products they 
supply, then there would be a financial incentive to reformulate the drinks 
to contain less sugar.93 This would be most effective as a national tax,94 
but two efforts by Representative Rosa L. DeLauro (D-Conn) never 
advanced out of committee.95 Yet municipal- and county-level taxes could 
still encourage healthier reformulations for regional brands and even 
national brands if enough cities adopt sugar taxes.96 Current tax paradigms 
solely based on drink volume, however, ignore the diversity in sugar 
content and the potential health effects.97 A sugar volume tax should 
encourage consumers to favor low-sugar products over high-sugar 
products.98 This is based on the logic that consumers presented with a 
cheaper price for drinks with less sugar will likely consume less soda 
overall, or they will choose healthier versions of sugary drinks due to the 
cost efficiency.99 
There are three promising ways to tax beverages based on their sugar 
content: a single-tier tax, a multi-tier tax, and a sugar content tax.100 A 
sugar content tax would proportionally vary with a drink’s sugar 
content.101 The United States government already uses a similar system for 
alcoholic drinks.102 Although a system that taxes proportionately to sugar 
content would inform the public of exactly how much sugar is in each 
beverage, the system could be difficult to apply in practice if the costs are 
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passed directly to the customer. This is because the various levels of sugar 
found in soft drinks could produce a strain on inventory systems due to 
awkward pricing consequences at the retail level.103 Tiered systems 
alleviate this concern. 
A single-tier system sets a threshold amount of sugar and taxes any 
beverage with more than that amount.104 Such a design was implemented 
in Hungary in 2011 with a threshold amount of nineteen grams per eight-
ounce serving.105 This was passed with a similar tax also placed on 
unhealthy sweets in the country.106 The results have been positive: a nearly 
twenty percent reduction in sugar-sweetened beverages and a thirty 
percent reduction in pre-packaged sweets.107 Hungary also reports some 
companies reduced the amount of sugar in their drinks to under nineteen 
grams per eight-ounce serving in anticipation of the tax.108 And models 
suggest that a one-tier system is the most likely avenue to induce 
manufacturers to reformulate their products to fall under the tax 
threshold.109 
The United Kingdom implemented a multi-tier system at the 
beginning of 2018.110 Drinks with total sugar content above five grams per 
100 milliliters are subject to a tax of eighteen pence (twenty-two cents) per 
liter, while the rate for drinks with more than eight grams will be taxed at 
twenty-four pence (twenty-nine cents) per liter.111 The United Kingdom 
tax was effective eight months prior to its implementation because soda 
companies began reducing sugar in their products to cut tax costs.112 Coca-
Cola stated it has over two hundred reformulation initiatives under way 
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and has already cut sugar levels in Sprite and Fanta by thirty-percent in the 
United Kingdom.113 
An input sugar tax, such as these tiered systems, is better at improving 
public health when compared to the taxes found in Seattle and Chicago 
because “an economist wants to place the tax as close to what you want to 
reduce as possible.”114 It gives two shots at fostering healthy habits: 
beverage manufacturers will be persuaded to use less sugar to fall under 
the tax threshold, and consumers will have an economic incentive to 
choose minimal sugar in the store.115 Tiered systems also encourage 
businesses to devote product development, marketing, and pricing efforts 
to lower-sugar options.116 The current tax in major United States cities 
passes most of the cost to the consumer at the retail level and is thus more 
regressive, falling heavily on low-income families,117 and the price 
increases have created an uproar.118 
Some experts claim that the regressive nature of sugar taxes is 
overstated, and the progression in long-term health among low-income 
consumers actually diminishes the financial regression to a marginal 
amount.119 They point to the same principal argument that cigarette 
regulation advocates have promulgated over the past 15–20 years: the 
taxes are indeed regressive, but the long-term health benefits substantially 
outweigh the current financial costs.120 Economists and think-tankers are 
generally not low income, however, and tend to be easier to convince than 
the masses paying a premium up front for their daily beverages,121 It 
becomes even more difficult when the American Beverage Association 
funds groups, such as Ax the Bev Tax, to publicly oppose the taxes.122 
Sugar regulation advocates have long realized that it would be foolish 
to put all of their eggs into one basket.123 Rather than centering the 
campaign around tax incentives and punishments, some advocates believe 
that a more effective answer to the obesity epidemic lies in educating the 
masses through mandatory nutrition and public health disclosures.124 
                                                                                                             
113 Id. 
114 Haspel, supra note 78 (quoting Helen Jensen, a professor of economics at Iowa State 
University). 
115 Id. 
116 See Marron, supra note 110. 
117 Id. 
118 See Trotter, supra note 53. 
119 See Campbell, supra note 106. 
120 Id. 
121 See Trotter, supra note 53. 
122 See Dent, supra note 83. 
123 See Pomeranz, supra note 26, at 194. 
124 Id. at 187. 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 285 
 
III. CHILLED BEVERAGE SPEECH 
A.  The State of Mandatory Nutrition Disclosures 
Public health advocates have called for marketing regulations to 
protect consumers since substantial evidence emerged indicating food and 
beverage advertising has a negative impact on public health, especially 
when encouraging nutrient-poor and calorie-dense food.125 The Nutritional 
Labeling and Education Act of 1990 imposed a myriad of requirements 
upon food and beverage suppliers, most importantly the implementation 
of the now iconic nutrition facts label.126 And the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) is still taking steps to make people more aware of 
the food choices they are making by expanding the detail of disclosures 
food manufacturers are required to make.127 The FDA now requires places 
such as amusement parks, chain restaurants, and movie theaters to post 
calorie counts on their menus.128 As of mid-2018, nutrition panels for 
cereal boxes, candy bars, and every other packaged food item in the 
supermarket require disclosure of how many grams of sugar were added 
to the product.129 
This is a sweet victory for soda regulation advocates. Discerning 
added sugars from natural sugars can be difficult,130 and there are plenty 
of healthy products that provide natural sugar, such as milk and tomato 
juice.131 It is counterproductive for the public health and FDA agendas to 
have these healthy beverages grouped with sodas and sports drinks for fear 
of inadequate nutrition.132 Food and drink manufacturers would commonly 
call sugar ingredients by deceptive names, such as high-fructose corn 
syrup, but now those ingredients fall under the category of “added sugars” 
on nutrition panels.133 And the numbers that appear on naturally sweetened 
beverages’ sugar panels are accompanied by a zero under a distinct added-
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sugar category, which reminds consumers that not all sugar is artificially 
added. 
Nutritional labels are useful, however, only if the target audience is 
reading them. Polls show that people making less than $30,000 per year 
view the nutrition labels on food packages less often than those who make 
more money, yet a still respectable sixty-eight percent of low income 
people say they pay a “great deal” or “fair amount” of attention to nutrition 
labels.134 But another study indicates people do not look at nutritional 
labels as often as they claim.135 Eye-tracking data shows only nine percent 
look at calorie counts nearly every time, despite a third of the study’s 
participants claiming they “almost always” look at a product’s caloric 
content.136 Some public health groups believe that enhancing nutritional 
labels will be insufficient to curb the obesity epidemic and a more 
aggressive measure should be taken to provide the public with the 
knowledge of sugar’s long-term consequences, especially regarding 
sugary drinks.137 
These groups have called for mandatory warning labels on 
advertisements for sugar-sweetened beverages like those on alcohol and 
tobacco ads.138 Unlike sugar taxes, these warnings would not cost 
taxpayers a penny.139 Yet the labels could provide vital knowledge for 
current and potential contributors to the obesity epidemic, allowing them 
to make more informed purchasing decisions.140 Warning labels on 
tobacco products underwent criticism at their inception because opponents 
claimed that smokers were adequately informed of the health risks.141 
Research shows, however, that many smokers were unaware that smoking 
increases the risk of stroke and over half did not believe smoking causes 
impotence.142 Yet in areas with mandatory disclosures, smokers show a 
significantly better understanding of smoking’s negative health 
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consequences.143 The effect is especially felt in low-income areas because 
the universal reach of mandatory disclosures are largely unaffected by 
barriers to information.144 
The same philosophy could apply to knowledge of sugar’s long-term 
health effects. Studies show critics were correct when they said all 
smokers know about lung cancer and cardiovascular disease,145 and they 
will likely be correct if they say that almost all people understand sugar is 
in soda and excessive amounts of it could lead to obesity. But some regular 
soda consumers may not fully understand fruit juices’ contributions to 
diabetes or the diseases that spawn from tooth decay,146 just like the many 
smokers who did not fully comprehend the extent of smoking’s effects on 
long-term health until they were consistently exposed to mandatory 
warning labels.147 
In 2014, California attempted to pass a bill that would have made it 
the first state to experiment with the theory that mandatory warning labels, 
like those on tobacco advertisements, could work with sugar-sweetened 
beverages.148 But the bill failed in the state legislature.149 A year later, San 
Francisco City and County lawmakers (“City” or “San Francisco”) 
unanimously voted to require all sugar-sweetened beverage print 
advertisements—defined as advertisements for “soda and other non-
alcoholic beverages that contain one or more added sweeteners and more 
than twenty-five calories per twelve fluid ounces of beverage”—to bear 
the message: “WARNING: Drinking beverages with added sugar(s) 
contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay. This is a message from 
the City and County of San Francisco.” in a distinct black box on no less 
than twenty percent of the advertisement.150 
B.  ABA v. San Francisco 
The American Beverage Association, California Retailers 
Association, and the California State Outdoor Advertising Association 
(“the Associations” or “ABA”) quickly filed suit for injunctive relief to 
prevent the implementation of the ordinance.151 The crux of the 
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Associations’ claim is that the warning creates a chilling effect on the 
members’ speech in violation of their First Amendment right to freedom 
of speech by requiring the Associations to bear an unjustified and undue 
burden of conveying a controversial claim hostile to their own products as 
a prerequisite to advertising them.152 San Francisco countered by claiming 
there is a substantial government interest in informing the public about the 
health risks of sugar, and thus the required warning is a justified burden 
upon the Associations so long as the disclosure is factual, accurate, and 
not misleading, which the City affirmatively posited for each claim.153 
1. The Zauderer Exception 
The first issue presented to the court was what level of scrutiny should 
be applied to the warning.154 By default, speech regulations must be strictly 
scrutinized under the First Amendment, and they are presumptively 
unconstitutional.155 Many appellate circuits have, however, carved out an 
exception for regulations that merely impose a disclosure requirement: the 
Zauderer exception.156 The Associations argued Zauderer should not 
apply because the Supreme Court has used Zauderer only after concluding 
the challenged regulation’s purpose is to redirect misleading commercial 
speech so as to prevent consumer deception, which is not applicable to the 
ABA’s advertisements.157 
The Ninth Circuit (on de novo review) and its district court disagreed 
with the Associations and found that Zauderer is the appropriate standard 
for the beverage disclosures.158 Under Zauderer, 
a commercial speaker’s constitutionally protected interest 
in refraining from providing consumers with additional 
information is minimal if a required disclosure is ‘[1] 
purely factual and [2] uncontroversial’ and is not ‘[3] 
unjustified or unduly burdensome’ so as to chill protected 
speech.159 
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It is the government’s burden to meet this standard.160 However, the 
Supreme Court had neither analyzed nor approved the Zauderer standard 
at the time of the initial Ninth Circuit decision for the types of cases in 
which courts had been applying it, namely “professional speech” 
limitations. That changed in mid-2018 when the Supreme Court approved 
Zauderer as an exception to strict scrutiny under certain circumstances, 
but it refused to treat “professional speech as a unique category that is 
exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles.”161 
The Ninth Circuit struggled to interpret the Supreme Court’s opinion. 
In a January 2019 rehearing decision, the full Ninth Circuit split as to 
whether the San Francisco ordinance fell under the purview of Zauderer 
and, if it did, how to apply the standard.162 But the court unanimously 
found the ordinance was unconstitutional.163 The following subsections 
summarize the district court’s and both of the Ninth Circuit’s opinions. 
2. District Court 
The ABA claimed the warning is misleading, and thus not purely 
factual and uncontroversial, because 
[The warning suggests that] (1) consuming beverages 
with added sugar is dangerous regardless of one’s diet or 
lifestyle; (2) consuming beverages with added sugar 
necessarily and inevitably contributes to obesity [and] 
diabetes; and (3) consuming beverages with added sugar 
uniquely contributes to obesity and diabetes.164 
Essentially, if sugar-sweetened beverage consumers were to have 
moderate amounts of sugar with a healthy lifestyle, then the beverages 
would not contribute to obesity or diabetes.165 It follows that the warning 
San Francisco imposes should require a qualifier—overconsumption of 
sugar-sweetened beverages contributes to obesity and diabetes—and it 
must be imposed on all sugary products so to be fair and constitutional.166 
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Otherwise, they argue, the accuracy of the warning is in reasonable 
dispute.167 
The Northern District of California reached the opposite conclusion 
and found the mandated warning is factual and accurate.168 The court also 
dismissed the argument that the sugar warning was under-inclusive 
because it was not placed on all advertisements for sugary products.169 The 
court reasoned that sugar-sweetened beverages are a significant source of 
calories, and overconsumption of calories contributes to the obesity 
epidemic, which the government has a substantial public interest in 
curbing.170 Thus, it is a reasonable strategy to piecemeal the regulatory war 
on obesity first with sugar-sweetened beverage warnings, and it is 
unreasonable to expect the government to regulate all sugar products at the 
outset.171 
As to the argument that the mandate is unjustified or unduly 
burdensome, the court was not convinced that the Associations would 
succeed on the merits of their claims.172 The Associations claimed that the 
required size—no less than twenty percent of the advertisement—of the 
warning forces the ABA to forgo print advertising because of its breadth, 
and thus it is an undue burden.173 The district court rejected the argument, 
relying on advertising experts claiming that tobacco product packaging 
and labeling should bear a health warning of fifty percent to be effective.174 
And, because the court was not without precedent for permitting the 
twenty percent requirement, it would permit the requirement in this 
instance.175 
Also, the court found little credibility in claims that ABA members 
will stop advertising in the market altogether “because tobacco companies 
have still profited even with the required warnings on the tobacco products 
themselves.”176 Throughout the analysis, the court did little to distinguish 
between the differences of the effects of warnings on tobacco products and 
warnings on sugar-sweetened beverage advertisements. But ultimately, it 
used the sugar-tobacco comparison to reach the conclusion that beverage 
advertisers are not unduly burdened by the San Francisco ordinance, 
although it conceded the constitutional argument has some force.177 
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3. Appellate Court Panel 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals gave more deference to the 
Associations’ argument that the size of the warning will reduce ABA 
members’ print advertisements in the San Francisco market to nearly 
nil.178 The court further agreed that if a required disclosure effectively 
rules out advertising in particular media, then it is unduly burdensome.179 
The panel’s opinion concluded that, because the black box overwhelms 
other visual elements in the advertisement, and it requires a conveyance of 
San Francisco’s disputed policy views, the warning is an unconstitutional 
burden on the Associations.180 
Further, where the lower court found factual accuracy within the 
Zauderer framework, the Ninth Circuit panel found controversy.181 The 
court took issue that “the warning is required exclusively on 
advertisements for sugar-sweetened beverages, and not on advertisements 
for other products with equal or greater amounts of added sugars and 
calories.”182 By singling out beverages and not mentioning behavioral 
risks, the ordinance can potentially lead consumers to believe that there is 
something innate about sugar-sweetened beverages that makes them a 
uniquely substantial contributor to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay as 
compared to something without a warning, such as candy.183 The research 
is unsettled as to that conclusion and thus creates a deceptive message—
or so said the panel.184 The court also took issue that there is no mention 
that added sugars are generally recognized as safe when not consumed in 
excess amounts or when part of an otherwise healthy dietary pattern.185 
Without sufficient qualifying language in the warning, the potential 
misleading effect of the warning led the court to conclude that the warning 
is, in effect, untrue and not purely factual, which accordingly chills the 
Associations’ speech.186 However, this opinion would not last because the 
Ninth Circuit granted an en banc rehearing. 
4. The En Banc Opinions 
Before the en banc rehearing, however, the United States Supreme 
Court decided a case—National Institute of Family and Life Advocates 
d/b/a NIFLA et al. v. Becerra (hereinafter “NIFLA”)—that clarified (or 
                                                                                                             
178 See Am. Beverage Ass’n, 871 F.3d at 897. 
179 Id. at 893. 
180 See id. at 897. 
181 Id. at 895. 
182 Id. 
183 See id. at 896. 
184 See id. at 895. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 897. 
292 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:269 
 
attempted to clarify) compelled commercial speech jurisprudence.187 The 
Court affirmed Zauderer as an appropriate exception to the strict scrutiny 
requirement for some First Amendment challenges.188 But the Court did 
not clearly delineate the circumstances in which Zauderer will apply or 
how it will apply, as evidenced by a split in the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning. 
The Ninth Circuit unanimously decided that the ordinance is 
unconstitutional, but there were four different opinions used to reach that 
unanimity, and two of them found Zauderer did not apply here.189 
Majority opinion: The court decided the case on the narrowest grounds 
possible. It found that the size of the warning—no less than twenty percent 
of the advertisement—created an undue burden on the manufacturers.190 
Because the state’s goal could be accomplished with a smaller size, the 
ordinance does not pass Zauderer’s undue burden requirement.191 The 
court noted that NIFLA did not require the Zauderer elements be applied 
in any particular order, so it began with the third element and forwent 
analyzing the factual accuracy of the warning.192 Not every judge agreed 
with this process or (lack of) analysis, however. 
Ikuta’s dissent in reasoning and concurrence in result: Judge Ikuta 
views Zauderer as a rational basis standard, not intermediate scrutiny.193 
Ultimately, she reasoned that Zauderer does not apply and heightened 
scrutiny was the appropriate standard here.194 If others agree, this would 
spell trouble for future laws that mandate warnings for beverage 
companies because the burden is on the government and it is a difficult 
burden to meet. 
Judge Ikuta premised this logic on two of the Supreme Court’s 
conclusions in NIFLA. First, these types of warnings are “content-based” 
compulsory disclosures, meaning they are presumptively 
unconstitutional.195 Second, the Court refused to treat any content-based 
disclosures as exempt categories of speech under the First Amendment 
unless it is the type of warning that has a “long tradition” of 
permissibility.196 That is where the Zauderer exception comes in: “laws 
that require professionals to disclose factual, noncontroversial information 
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in their ‘commercial speech’” are given more deferential review because 
they have a long history of permissibility.197 
Judge Ikuta then set forth her interpretation of how Zauderer functions 
in light of the recent NIFLA opinion: 
To determine whether the Zauderer exception applies, a 
court must consider whether the compelled speech 
governs only [1] ‘commercial advertising’ and requires 
the disclosure of [2] ‘purely factual and [3] 
uncontroversial information about [4] the terms under 
which . . . services will be available.’ (citation omitted). If 
the government regulation meets those requirements, the 
regulation should be upheld unless it is [5] ‘unjustified or 
[6] unduly burdensome.’ (citation omitted). If the 
regulation does not qualify for the Zauderer exception, the 
regulation must survive heightened scrutiny to avoid 
violating the First Amendment.198 
Regarding the San Francisco ordinance, the threshold inquiry—
whether it is commercial advertising—is obviously satisfied. The second 
inquiry, however, is not met because “[t]he factual accuracy of the warning 
is disputed in the record.”199 
Thus, the Zauderer exception does not apply, and the ordinance must 
pass heightened scrutiny.200 It does not pass. The ordinance is “wildly 
underinclusive” because (1) it does not apply “to all sugar-sweetened 
beverages, much less all sugar-sweetened products” and (2) it does not 
apply to all forms of advertising, such as television or radio.201 
Accordingly, the ordinance must be struck down. 
Christian and Thomas’s concurrence: This opinion argued Zauderer 
applies, but it focused on the order in which to apply the factors.202 It noted 
that the first two factors—purely factual and uncontroversial 
information—were not at issue in NIFLA, which is why the Supreme Court 
did not consider them.203 However, because they are the first two factors, 
they should be considered prior to the undue burden analysis.204 Here, the 
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message is literally false as to type 1 diabetes, so the ordinance fails the 
first factor and the analysis should stop there.205 
Nguyen concurrence: Judge Nguyen, in the same fashion as Judge 
Ikuta, views Zauderer as a rational basis test, not intermediate scrutiny.206 
But she believes Zauderer applies only to laws that regulate misleading 
and false commercial speech, not all commercial speech.207 By default, 
commercial speech is subject to intermediate scrutiny under the Central 
Hudson standard.208 She opined that the Supreme Court had the 
opportunity to expand Zauderer beyond deceptive commercial speech, but 
it declined to do so.209 Because this ordinance is not designed to curb false 
and misleading speech, the proper standard here is Central Hudson 
intermediate scrutiny, which this ordinance fails to meet.210 
C. Is it Purely Factual and Uncontroversial that Sugar-Sweetened 
Beverages Contribute to the Obesity Epidemic? 
Regardless of whether Zauderer or heightened scrutiny applies, future 
warnings will need to carefully avoid statements that are not scientifically 
considered fact because this ordinance failed both. The Ninth Circuit panel 
concluded the warnings required by the San Francisco ordinance infringe 
on free speech rights due, in part, to conflicting scientific philosophies 
regarding sugar’s impact on the obesity epidemic.211 Likewise, some 
concurring opinions in the en banc decision noted the warning is literally 
false as to type 1 diabetes, and they mentioned several times that the 
factual accuracy of the rest of the warning is in dispute.212 Much of the 
controversy, however, involves who is performing the research, not 
necessarily the findings. 
1. Is the research corrupted? 
A systemic review of systemic reviews found that studies conducted 
with sponsorship or potential conflict of interest with food or beverage 
companies were five times more likely to report a conclusion that there is 
no association between sugar-sweetened beverages and obesity.213 Studies 
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show that Coca-Cola Company or PepsiCo sponsored ninety-six health 
organizations from 2011–15 and lobbied against twenty-nine proposed 
public health bills in that period.214 Additionally, Coca-Cola Company has 
provided financial and logistical support to a nonprofit organization, 
Global Energy Balance Network, that broadcasts the argument that 
Americans pay too much attention to sugar in their diets and insufficient 
attention to their exercise habits.215 All of this suggests existing conflicts 
of interest within the scientific community due to large beverage 
companies’ financial influence.216 If the data derived from these studies is 
tainted with corruption, then the scientific findings are likely not what is 
in controversy. 
2. Should sugary drinks be distinguished from non-beverage 
sugar products? 
Future beverage warnings also need to consider the court’s 
underinclusive concerns: the warnings either need to be applied to all sugar 
products or it must be uncontroversial that liquified sugar is more 
responsible for diabetes, obesity, and tooth decay than sugar in food. Some 
studies suggest they should be distinguished.217 Because liquified sugar is 
delivered to the liver quicker than sugar in solid food, there may be a 
higher risk of fat accumulation.218 But there is insufficient evidence from 
sustained consumption studies to consider this uncontroversial.219 
Many investigators argue that sugar-sweetened beverages are 
particularly harmful because of the high concentration of sugar in a single 
container, a low-satiety effect per calorie consumed, and the stimulation 
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of appetite.220 The results of that hypothesis, however, are conflicted.221 
Differences in designs and methodologies have created difficulties in 
sustaining consistency across experiments.222 Some studies indicate that 
consuming beverages before meals leads to overeating, which could 
contribute to obesity if done regularly,223 but the same is true for milk in 
addition to beverages with added sugars.224 Two other studies that 
examined the effect of liquid-based sugar against solid-based sugar 
seemed to show no significant difference.225 
3. Can the warnings be constitutional if they are only on 
beverages? 
The scientific results produce two conflicting schools of thought 
regarding the legality of mandatory disclosures for sugar-sweetened 
beverages. The first school believes that sugar-sweetened beverages are 
especially influential on the obesity epidemic and the public requires more 
education on the matter.226 Proponents call for mandated warnings because 
the public has difficulty adhering to recommended levels of sugar intake 
with beverage companies’ current marketing and packaging practices.227 
They believe the insufficiency of long-term studies is outweighed by the 
data indicating high concentrations of added sugar leads to poor choices 
among consumers.228 Neurological mechanisms produce addictive 
qualities in the brain when consuming sugar, particularly liquified 
sugar.229 This supports the notion that the obesity epidemic is a sugar 
epidemic partly fueled by soda.230 The first school thus concludes that the 
advertising disclosure mandated by San Francisco is accurate and not 
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misleading in the same way the statute requiring alcohol labels to warn 
that “consumption of alcoholic beverages . . . may cause health problems” 
is accurate and not misleading.231 
The second school of thought disagrees that the San Francisco 
mandate is comparable to alcohol disclosures because the phrase “may 
cause health problems” tempers the effect of alcohol warnings and 
equivalent language is absent from the sugar disclosures.232 Exponents 
believe the warning becomes misleading without qualifying language 
because moderate sugar consumption within a healthy lifestyle will not 
lead to obesity, diabetes, or tooth decay.233 Further, because the warning 
would appear only on beverages with added sugar and not on all products 
with added sugar, the public could be misled into believing that sugar-
sweetened beverages are especially dangerous, and there is evidence to 
contradict that notion.234 Thus, the warning mandated by San Francisco 
places an unfair burden on beverage companies by requiring them “to 
convey the City’s controversial opinion.”235 The warning is also unfair 
because it does not require the same mandate on all other sugary products 
that may contribute to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay.236 
IV. POLICYMAKERS’ BEST OPTIONS FOR REGULATING SUGAR-
SWEETENED BEVERAGES 
The Ninth Circuit panel decision was in accordance with the second 
school of thought: 
[T]he warning singles out sugar-sweetened beverages 
without mentioning behavioral risks, and thus clearly 
implies that there is something inherent about sugar-
sweetened beverages that contributes to these health risks 
in a way that other sugar-sweetened products do not, 
regardless of consumer behavior.237 
As a result, policymakers may resort to options other than the failed 
San Francisco warning for fear of a First Amendment challenge. The court, 
however, hinted that a qualification—”may contribute”—could suffice to 
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bring the warning out of reasonable dispute.238 If a simple “may” is all the 
court requires to pass constitutional muster, then advocates should be 
clamoring for their representatives to pass conforming ordinances. But the 
unfair burden on beverage companies would persist. 
That is why requiring all producers of added sugar products—food 
and beverage alike—to implement a warning like San Francisco’s is the 
best option to attack the obesity epidemic. The ABA’s unfair burden 
argument would collapse because the warning would no longer single out 
any industry or producer. And the public at large would become more 
informed of the dangers it is ingesting with its food and beverages. 
Limiting the mandate to products with added sugar would spare healthy 
products, such as fruits. Hungary has already experienced success with a 
similar system.239 To reduce obesity and knock the United States off its 
infamous perch as the most obese nation in history, advocates must 
continue the war against sugar on two fronts—mandatory disclosures on 
food and drinks. 
Mandatory disclosures should not be the only weapon. Widespread 
taxes on added sugar would provide consumers with a financial incentive 
to eat and drink healthier substances, which should reduce obesity, 
increase life expectancy, and save taxpayers long-term costs.240 Initial 
research indicates that a sugar tax would accomplish those goals.241 
Specifically, an input tax, such as the United Kingdom’s multi-tiered tax 
on sugar-sweetened beverages, should encourage manufacturers to use 
less sugar, thereby optimizing the tax’s potential to reduce obesity.242 
Revenue from an added sugar tax could then be used to develop programs 
that promote healthy choices and cheaper access to superior nutrition, like 
the plan in Seattle.243 
In 1965, forty-two percent of adults smoked cigarettes and that 
number dwindled to less than seventeen percent by 2014.244 It did not take 
many decades for cigarette taxes and warning labels to become 
widespread, effectively reducing tobacco’s negative health effects through 
education and economic incentives.245 Sugar may be no different. More 
policymakers should take note of the United States’ position as the world’s 
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most obese nation and largest sugar consumer,246 then enlist familiar 
tactics—taxes and warning labels—to combat the obesity epidemic. 
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